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Abstract 
 
Literature analysing the interrelation of religion and economic performance suggests religion 
to explain differences in household income. Religious communities foster economically 
conducive attitudes and are important sources of social capital, particularly under weak 
economic structures. This paper targets at investigating effects of religiosity on rural 
household income using survey data from Greater Sekhukhune in the Limpopo Province of 
South Africa. Using insights from religious studies within a conceptual framework of rural 
household decision-making, the authors estimate an income equation that includes measures 
for religious affiliation. While church membership per se does not reveal a significant effect 
on household income, the results show a positive and robust relationship for membership in 
the Zion Christian Church and the practice of African traditional religion. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent literature concludes that research on differences in economic performance must 
account for political, social and cultural factors (Barro & McCleary, 2003; Selinger, 2004). 
Related to this broad view on determinants of economic success in general, various studies 
have emphasized the role of religion (cf. de Jong, 2011). The research thus far does not yield 
unanimous conclusions and likely, no general answer exists. This may be because effects of 
religion on economic success vary across religious communities and different contexts. 
 
Religiosity – the degree to which religion1 is relevant in daily life – can be argued to affect 
economic performance through its intrinsic dimension (beliefs, norms, ethics) and social 
dimension (social capital). Most economic research on religion and economic performance 
relies on Weber’s (1920) notion of the Protestant Ethic to undergird empirical work: Weber 
suggests that by penetrating all spheres of every-day life, intrinsic religiosity changes 
believers’ behaviour in economically favourable ways. While Weber’s hypothesis has been 
debated for many years, the recent boom of African Initiated Churches (AICs)2, also known 
as ‘African Reformation’ (Anderson, 2001), imposes new contemporary relevance on this 
topic: These churches foster a similarly intensive religiosity as Weber saw it in early modern 
Protestantism (Meyer, B, 2004). Against this backdrop, the question arises whether AICs 
produce effects comparable to those initially noted by Weber. 
 
Religious studies’ research has put forward strong arguments in favour of an economically 
conducive role of AICs in South Africa, especially Pentecostal-Charismatic churches. 
However, many of these studies predominantly base their analyses on qualitative research 
                                                          
1 Extending Iannaccone’s (1998) definition, we define religion as any shared set of beliefs, activities, organisations and 
institutions premised on faith in supernatural forces that affect the adherents’ lives and are worshipped.  
2 AICs are characterised by the contextual relevance of the spiritual in believers’ lives. Following Anderson (2000) the term is 
understood here as including both Zionist/Apostolic churches as well as Pentecostal-Charismatic churches. 
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while quantitative-econometric substantiation is lacking (e.g., Meyer, LER, 2004, Schlemmer 
2008, Mafuta 2010). With this paper, we aim at contributing to closing this gap. Our objective 
is to investigate potential effects of religiosity on economic success. We carry out a case study 
to quantify whether the religiosity fostered by AICs in South Africa is conducive to economic 
success by econometric techniques. We hypothesize that in rural South Africa religiosity 
positively influences the household’s economic situation and therefore reflects in higher 
household income. We expand the existing literature by providing a micro-level case study on 
a specific and limited context, the former Fetakgomo Municipality3 in the Greater 
Sekhukhune District of the Limpopo Province. The results contribute to the understanding of 
the determinants of household income in South Africa’s rural north by highlighting the role of 
religion. 
 
Due to their highly diverse religious landscape, the rural areas of northern South Africa 
provide an excellent setting for this case study. In Fetakgomo Municipality, questions on the 
determinants of economic success seem particularly pertinent: As a South African poverty 
node and part of the former Lebowa homeland4, the municipality has a weak economic base 
(Drimie et al., 2009; StatsSA, 2016). We hence expect social capital effects of religion to be 
particularly relevant. Moreover, the municipality offers a diverse religious landscape: 
Members of various AICs and mainline churches5 live in this region, along with people 
practicing African traditional religion (ATR) and nonreligious persons. At the same time, the 
area is relatively homogeneous in terms of economic development, sociodemographic 
composition and culture: It is entirely rural, incoming migration is low and 94% of the 
population belong to the Bapedi cultural group (StatsSA, 2016). Limiting the scope to this 
                                                          
3 Fetakgomo Municipality was merged with Greater Tubatse Municipality in 2016. It had a population of 93 795 in 22 851 
households (StatsSA, 2016). 
4 One of 10 ‘self-governing’ areas based on the ethnic segregation of the black South African population during Apartheid. 
5 That is, churches emanating from a European or North American mission background. 
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area allows us to focus on the contextually relevant categories of religion and to narrow down 
the possibility of unobserved factors that may confound empirical identification. We draw on 
insights from theology and religious studies about the mechanisms through which religiosity 
transmits to economic performance. Our empirical analysis is based on a conceptual 
framework sketching the role of religion in household decision-making – a desideratum 
highlighted, inter alia, by de Jong (2011). With respect to its intrinsic dimension, religiosity 
changes economic attitudes and constitutes emotional support. In its social dimension, 
religion constitutes a social capital-type resource and therefore directly relates to income. 
 
Using data from a household survey6 conducted in 2011, we estimate a household income 
equation within a log-linear regression model, where we relate income to contextual 
categories of religious affiliation and practice. To hedge against misspecification, we carry out 
several robustness checks. We employ a Heckman-type approach (cf. Heckman, 1979) to test 
for potential selectivity biases arising from unobserved variables confounding measured 
impacts of religiosity and self-selection into religiosity. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
state of the art, followed by a description of the dataset (section 3). Section 4 outlines the 
analytical and empirical approaches, followed by the presentation and discussion of the 
results (section 5). The final section concludes. 
 
2. Background and literature review  
2.1 Economic research on religion and economic success 
Economic research has investigated economic effects of religion both at the macro and micro 
levels. At the macroeconomic level, studies have examined the effect on economic growth 
                                                          
6 We present a description of sampling and data collection in supplementary appendix A/2. 
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and development caused by religious fragmentation (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2003), the 
shares of different religions (Noland, 2005) or aggregated indicators of belief and practice 
from large-scale surveys (Barro & McCleary, 2003; Mangeloja, 2005). Analysing the impact 
of religion at the microeconomic level, the effects of religious affiliation and behaviour on 
income (Bettendorf & Dijkgraaf, 2010, 2011; Lipford & Tollison, 2003) and economic 
attitudes (Guiso et al., 2003; Brañas-Garza et al., 2009) have been investigated.7 
 
These results, however, are highly ambiguous and no general conclusions can be drawn based 
on this research (cf. de Jong, 2011). While Barro & McCleary (2003) show a positive effect 
of belief and a negative effect of religious practice, Bettendorf & Dijkgraaf (2010) conclude 
that religious affiliation has a positive effect in high-income countries, while a negative one is 
found for low-income countries. Where Bettendorf & Dijkgraaf (2011) find a negative effect 
of Islam, Noland (2005) shows Islam’s effect to be nonnegative. Most economic studies on 
the relationship of religion and economic performance use cross-country or cross-regional 
datasets. This entails the inevitable implicit assumption that the religious categories used as 
explanatory variables are homogeneous. Thus, context-specific characteristics of religions are 
not taken into account. Moreover, empirical findings might suffer from unobserved 
heterogeneity such as geographical, institutional and cultural differences across countries 
(Guiso et al., 2003). 
 
2.2 Insights on religion and economic success from theology and religious studies  
In religious studies, it has been criticised (e.g. de Jong, 2011) that most of the economic 
research fails to lay open the transmission mechanisms and impact pathways through which 
religion affects economic performance. Literature from theology and religious studies may 
offer detailed explanations for identified effects in economic research. Most prominently, 
                                                          
7 In supplementary appendix A/1 we provide an overview table presenting recent micro-level studies. 
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Weber (1920) argues along the lines of an effect of religion’s intrinsic dimension: religion 
facilitated a change in the attitudes and behaviour of the adherents of early modern Protestant 
denominations. Thus, their religious ethics promoted the development of capitalism. 
However, these Protestant ethics only developed because of an increase in the ‘ecclesiastic-
religious domination of life’ brought about by the reformation (Weber, 1920; authors’ 
translation). According to Weber, the increase of the relevance of religion in every-day life, 
that is, an increase in religiosity, was the prerequisite for an impact of religion on economic 
behaviour.  
 
Another aspect of intrinsic religiosity is emotional support through religion (cf. Mangeloja, 
2005). As Cilliers & Wepener (2007) argue, religious beliefs constitute a system of values, 
norms, identity and transcendence that provide ‘spiritual endurance’. It increases believers’ 
resilience against adverse circumstances and external shocks, such as the death of a family 
member, natural catastrophes, criminal acts and poverty (cf. Masondo, 2014). This is highly 
relevant in contexts of high adversity, such as the poverty-stricken rural areas of South Africa. 
 
Religiosity also affects economic success through its social dimension, which constitutes 
social capital – a resource that has economic returns (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Woolcock & 
Narayan, 2000). The literature suggests, first, that religious networks provide a form of risk 
mitigation (Dehejia et al., 2007). Second, networks reduce transaction costs (Coleman, 1988; 
Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Third, they provide club goods (Coleman, 1988). Mafuta 
(2010) shows this for the example of the South African Zion Christian Church (ZCC), which 
organizes savings groups, provides insurance schemes and conducts entrepreneurship 
trainings for its members. In principal, these functions are not limited to religious social 
capital. However, the role of religious social capital could be argued to be unique because of 
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the high degree of trust and cohesion these networks command, which is constantly created 
and (re-)affirmed through religious ritual (Cilliers & Wepener, 2007). Moreover, religious 
communities constitute the largest social networks in many developing countries. 
 
Recent research on AICs in South Africa has highlighted that today more than half of the 
country’s population are members of an AIC (cf. Öhlmann et al., 2016). Many of these 
churches foster high religiosity in both the intrinsic and the social dimension. They actively 
engage in the economic upliftment of their members and many of the more Pentecostal AICs 
preach a gospel of wealth, portraying the economic success of their members as divine 
promise (Cross et al., 1993; Schlemmer, 2008; Heuser, 2015). Regarding the economic effects 
of AICs, Garner (2000) and Dickow (2012) show a high upward social mobility of their 
members. Mafuta (2010) and Meyer (LER, 2004) find positive economic effects for specific 
denominations. 
 
3. Case study Fetakgomo Municipality: dataset and descriptives  
 
The dataset stems from a household survey conducted in Fetakgomo Municipality. 
Supplementary appendix A/2 provides a description of the data collection process. The survey 
questionnaire can be found in supplementary appendix B. We take the household head’s 
religiosity as proxy of the entire household’s religiosity, measured by affiliation with a certain 
type of church (Apostolic, mainline, Pentecostal-Charismatic, ZCC, St. Engenas ZCC and 
other churches)8, and the practice of ATR. Church membership and traditional religion are not 
mutually exclusive. All these religious communities foster different intensities and forms of 
religiosity. Moreover, we have information on two religious core dimensions according to 
                                                          
8 Of the specific church categories, all but mainline churches can be classified as either Pentecostal-type or Pentecostal AICs 
(Anderson, 2000). 
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Huber & Huber (2012): public practice (worship attendance) and private practice (prayer 
frequency). 
 
In order to measure household income, both formal and informal sector income as well as the 
implicit monetary value of agricultural subsistence production must be considered. We rely 
on a livelihood strategy based approach. That is, households were asked for any income-
generating activities of their members and their respective monetary returns. In the case of 
agricultural subsistence production, monetary values were imputed. Field crop production was 
valued by the average quantity harvested per year, livestock and livestock products by the 
number/quantity produced per year and firewood by the quantity gathered. Horticultural 
production was valued by the area under cultivation.  
 
Table 1 
 
As reported in Table 1, monthly income ranges from ZAR 305 (US$ 44) to ZAR 32 735 (US$ 
4676) with the mean at ZAR 4356 (US$ 622).9 Agriculture is the most important income 
source, followed by social grants and informal (self-)employment. Roughly half of the 
households receive remittances and only a fifth of all households have formal income at all. In 
terms of the mean returns, formal income is the most important income source with R 8085 
(US$ 1155). Social grants and informal income are almost equally important with mean 
returns of R 1417 (US$ 170) and R 1190 (US$ 202), respectively (cf. Table 1). 
 
Table 2 
 
                                                          
9 US$ equivalent calculated based on an exchange rate at the time of data collection of US$ 1 = ZAR 7. Figures rounded to 
nearest US$ 1. 
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In terms of household characteristics, we consider a dummy variable for a female household 
head (gender), the age of the household head (age), the number of household members (size) 
and the share of household members below and above working age (s_child and s_pens, 
respectively). The majority of the households (64%) are headed by women. Mean age of 
heads is 55 years (cf. Table 2) and more than half of the household members are either 
children (45%) or pensioners (14%). 
 
The distance to the nearest tar road (road) and the distance to the nearest larger shop (shop) in 
kilometres capture the degree of remoteness and reflect the weak economic structures of the 
area. On average, households are located 3.5 kilometres away from the next tar road and 
nearly 20 kilometres away from the next supermarket. Human capital, as measured by the 
school and tertiary education of the household head (school and tertiary), offers insights in 
educational disadvantages. The majority of the household heads in the dataset have not 
completed primary education. Schooling of other household members at working age 
(school_o), the number of additional household members who completed a learnership (learn) 
or academic education (acad) show the educational levels of the other household members, 
predominantly children who have not yet moved out of the household. We also consider a 
dummy variable for the existence of a clinic in the village (clinic) to proxy the household’s 
health status. Finally, to retrieve information on social capital we consider the number of 
groups the household is a member of (groups), such as burial societies or village committees, 
and by the proximity to the local chief (chief). 
 
Mean income and mean religiosity indicators show substantial differences between religious 
groups (cf. Table 3). Household income of mainline church adherents is twice as high as the 
average in the dataset and correlated with the highest educational levels. Indicators of 
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religiosity are higher in all AICs than in mainline churches. However, religiosity seems to be 
highest among members of Zionist churches. Members of the ZCC reported the highest prayer 
frequency, more than twice a day on average, and attend more congregational activities than 
members of all other churches. Although church membership and ATR are not mutually 
exclusive, the two variables are negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient of –0.64. 
 
Table 3 
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4. Analytical framework 
4.1 Religion and household decision-making 
In order to investigate the impact of religion on economic success10 at household level, we 
draw on Becker’s (1965) model of household production and Low’s (1986) model of deficit-
producing households in Southern Africa. This approach assumes one common household 
utility function and takes into account the allocation of time – a key factor influenced by 
religion. The household allocates time in accordance with its preferences for so-called z-
goods. Such z-good is ‘the seeing of a play, which depends on the input of actors, script, 
theatre and the playgoer's time; another is sleeping, which depends on the input of a bed, 
house (pills?) and time’ (Becker, 1965). These goods are produced by the household 
according to a household production function with market goods and time as inputs. If the 
household prefers z-goods that require a larger share of market good inputs (such as a satellite 
dish) the household will allocate more time on wage labour. If the household prefers time-
intensive z-goods (such as social activities), less household time will be allocated to wage 
labour. 
 
Religion enters the framework in three ways. First, it is a human and social capital-type asset 
(Narayan & Pritchett, 1999) increasing the market-earning potential of the household 
members. Second, religion is a z-good – that is, it yields utility and potentially decreases the 
time allocated to wage labour. Third, religion changes the household’s preferences and the 
structure of the household’s utility function, as it alters the relative valuation of z-goods. This 
is an economic description of the Weberian argument presented above. Such shift in 
preferences affects the household’s economic decision-making through the allocation of the 
                                                          
10 In the context considered here, economic success is not to imply vast wealth. In many cases the issue is survival, not 
prosperity (Garner 2004). 
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household members’ time. One household might diversify the income portfolio through 
agricultural activities, while another one might not.  
 
In principal, an alteration of the utility function because of religiosity can increase or decrease 
the time allocated to wage labour and subsistence good production and hence has an 
ambiguous effect on the household’s overall income. Based on the religious studies research 
cited in section 2, we expect religiosity to shape preferences in such a way that labour supply 
in subsistence production and the formal and informal labour markets is increased. 
Furthermore, we assume that the sum of the effects described is positive and therefore 
religiosity increases household income. 
 
4.2 Empirical strategy 
To identify and quantify potential effects of religiosity on household income we resort to the 
following income equation (cf. Glewwe, 1991) as a basis for our empirical model. We include 
religiosity as additional variables on the right-hand side measured by church membership and 
ATR practice. 
 ( )i i i i i i iF , , , ,income = ,a g hc sc r e ,  (1) 
where ai is a vector of household characteristics, gi a vector of geographical characteristics, 
hci a vector of human capital characteristics, sci a vector of social capital characteristics, ri a 
vector of religiosity characteristics of household i. Symbol ei denotes an error term. Since we 
assume land for subsistence production to be non-scarce (Low 1986), it is not included in (1). 
 
To estimate the income equation we use a natural logarithmic transformation of the dependent 
variable income. Aside from moving the distribution of the outcome variable closer to normal 
distribution, it is likely that the independent variables have exponential effects. For example, 
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education would not increase income by a certain amount, but rather by a certain percentage, 
as there are various other factors influencing the outcome at the same time. Dummy variables 
account for the membership in one of the six church categories and the practice of traditional 
religion. The finally estimated empirical model is given by:  
 
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 4 i 5 i 6 i 7 i
8 i 9 i 10 i 11 i 12 i 13 i
14 i 15 i 16 i 17 i 18 i 19
ln( ) β +β +β +β +β _ +β _ +β +β
+β +β +β _ +β +β +β
+β +β β +β +β +β
iincome gender age size s child s pens road shop
school tertiary school o learn acad clinic
group chief mainline zcc engenas ap
=
+ i
20 i 21 i 22 i i+β +β +β +
ostolic
charismatic other atr e
  (2) 
Symbol β0 denotes the intercept, where β1 … β22 denote the coefficients to be estimated. For a 
description of the variables, we refer to section 3.1 and table 2. We use an ordinary least 
squares estimator. In order to check for robustness, we also employ non-linear version of (2), 
showing similar results. Given the relatively small sample at hand, we opt for the linear 
model.  
 
The question arises, however, whether correlations identified using (2) can be interpreted as 
causal effects. As the data is non-experimental (that is, assignment of households to religious 
categories is not random, but by the choice of the household head), our empirical estimates 
may potentially suffer from selectivity issues. Unobserved heterogeneity may affect both, 
household income, and the decision to join a certain religious group. This could lead to biased 
estimates of the coefficients in (2) (cf. Cameron & Trivedi, 2005:868). To address this issue, 
we test for selection bias using a Heckman (1979) two-step procedure (cf. Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005 and supplementary appendix A/3 for further details).11 
 
 
                                                          
11 We cannot entirely rule out the possibility of a reverse relation in the sense that higher income directly affects religiosity, 
particularly in the ZCC. Given the case study’s aim to present first insights with a rather small sample at hand, we cannot 
address this issue here. Larger samples with at least a repeated cross section structure would be desirable in this context.  
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5. Results 
In Table 4/I we present the estimation results of the log-linear income equation (2). The 
adjusted R² of 0.48 indicates that the model explains nearly half the variation in household 
income. Eight of the coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level, four of those at the 
1% level (see table 4). The sociodemographic characteristics reveal signs of the coefficients in 
line with the expectations and common results from household surveys. The negative 
coefficient of gender indicates that female-headed households have lower income. Positive 
coefficients of age and size show that household income increases with the age of the 
household head and the number of household members, respectively. Geographical factors 
seem to play a subordinate role, which we conjecture to be due to the relatively small 
geographic area covered. The positive coefficients of three of the human capital variables 
resonate well with human capital theory. The number of school years (school) and tertiary 
qualifications (tertiary) completed by the household head is positively related to income, so 
are the tertiary qualifications of the other household members (acad). Neither of the two 
social capital variables has a significant coefficient. 
 
Two of the religion dummy variables, ZCC and ATR, have significant positive coefficients. 
Household income is higher when the household head is a member of ZCC or practices 
ATR.12 Not only are their coefficients statistically significant, their size indicates substantial 
economic significance as well. In order to quantify the magnitude of these coefficients, one 
can re-transform the model as given in (2). Membership in the ZCC increases income by the 
factor 0.469 1.598e = , practice of ATR by the factor 0.314 1.369e = . On average, members of 
ZCC and those practicing ATR have 59.8% and 36.9% higher household income, 
respectively. This constitutes amounts of roughly R 2600 and R 1600 when looking at the 
                                                          
12 The fact that none of the other religion dummies has a significant coefficient does not necessarily mean that these groups 
do not have an effect. This could also be due to the low number of observations in these categories. 
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mean household income of R 4356 in the dataset. In the Greater Sekhukhune District, as a 
poor economic context, these amounts constitute substantial differences to rural households. 
 
Table 4 
 
As a robustness check, we run the same model with only one dummy variable for membership 
in any church (cf. table 4/II). The non-significant coefficient of church indicates that church 
membership per se is not significantly correlated with household income when correcting for 
the other factors in the regression. The identified correlation from model (2) (cf. table 4/I) 
points to specific church categories affecting household income. As these church categories 
both indicate specific sets of theological tenets and specific levels of intrinsic and social 
religiosity (cf. table 3), we conjecture the relationship contingent on these tenets and levels of 
religiosity. The fact that ZCC and ATR, which constitute two very distinct belief systems, are 
positively related to income might indicate that levels of religiosity are more decisive than 
theological tenets. While we cannot fully discern this based on the data at hand, it would be 
consistent with the theoretical framework outlined above. The more intense religiosity is in 
the social dimension, the more likely it is to constitute social capital. The more intense it is in 
the intrinsic dimension, the more likely that it actually does alter preferences. 
 
In order to substantiate our hypothesis of a potentially causal relationship of ZCC and ATR 
on household income, we use the Heckman two-step procedure to test for potential selection 
effects (cf. supplementary appendix A/3 where we detail the procedure). The first stage probit 
estimations for zcc, we identify chief and school_o from the probit estimation as two variables 
fulfilling the exclusion restriction of being uncorrelated with the outcome variable except 
through their correlation with zcc (cf. table 5, both coefficients significantly different from 
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zero at the 5% level). The probability of being a member of ZCC is higher for those 
household heads related to the chief and decreases with the number of school years completed 
by the additional adult household members. At the same time, both variables are uncorrelated 
with household income when correcting for membership in the ZCC (table 4/I).  
 
Table 5 
 
We conjecture that in the case of chief this has to do with the status of ZCC as a majority 
church and the fact that their theology includes elements of traditional belief systems. This 
includes healing, prophecy, a positive relationship with one’s ancestors and protection powers 
against evil spirits (Anderson 2000; Mokgobi, 2014). Tradition is particularly relevant in the 
context of traditional royal courts. It can be assumed that people in this context (relatives, 
members of the court etc., as captured in the variable chief) are likely to join a church that 
makes reference to these beliefs. ZCC would be a preferred choice compared to other AICs 
because of its reputation of granting spiritual protection and because of its immense size 
indicating its power. At the same time, it is credible that the relationship to the chief itself 
does not affect household income. While the traditional authorities have important functions 
in the given context regarding local tradition and their offices have some administrative 
functions, they cannot be seen as bearers of large economic power to the extent that their 
royal court and extended family would substantially benefit from this (as confirmed by the 
nonsignificant coefficient, cf. table 4/I). The negative effect of the other household members’ 
schooling could be explained by the fact that ZCC is a church with strong membership in 
rural areas and among less educated people. Hence, people from less educated households 
might be more likely to join the church (cf. Müller, 2011). 
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In the case of practice of ATR it is more difficult to find a variable that fulfils the requirement 
of not being correlated with atr, but uncorrelated with household income. The only candidate 
from table (5) is clinic, the negative coefficient indicating a lower probability if a clinic exists 
in the village. Our interpretation is that the more difficult the access to health facilities, the 
more likely a person is to rely on traditional religion for healing purposes. 
 
Table 6 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the second stage estimation of the Heckman procedure where 
we added the inverse Mill’s ratio as an additional regressor to capture possible selectivity bias 
(cf. supplementary appendix A/3). We cannot reject the hypothesis that these results do not 
suffer from selection bias, since in both cases (ZCC membership and practice of ATR) the 
respective coefficients are not significantly different from zero at any usual level. The results, 
however, must be interpreted in the context of the case study with relatively low number of 
observations and, in the case of atr, relatively weak explanatory power in the first-stage probit 
model.  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
Based on a household survey in the Greater Sekhukhune District, we investigate the relation 
between religiosity and rural household income. Using a regression-based approach, we 
explain household income by measures of socio-demographic characteristics, geography, 
human and social capital as well as indicators of church membership and the practice of 
African traditional religion. We find two indicators of religiosity to be strongly correlated 
with household income: membership in the Zion Christian Church and the practice of African 
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Traditional Religion. This correlation is specific to the ZCC; no other church category reveals 
a relevant relation to household income.  
 
A crucial question is whether these correlations can be interpreted as causal effects. Relying 
on evidence from recent research in theology and religious studies, we find that membership 
in ZCC and practice of ATR have a potentially causal impact on household income. This is 
substantiated by a Heckman two-step procedure, though acknowledging the relatively small 
sample.  
 
It is important to note three caveats regarding our empirical procedure. First, the results must 
be interpreted in the context of the relatively small sample. While we conclude that 
membership in the ZCC has an effect on household income, we cannot conclude that this is 
the only church in which membership goes along with increased economic success. Second, 
the Heckman test depends on the strength of the identifying variables. While based on our 
estimations we can be relatively confident about those factors determining ZCC membership, 
the identifying variable for practice of ATR is relatively weak. Hence, the causal 
interpretation of ATR needs to be treated with caution. Third, our data is statistically 
representative only for the geographical area of the former Fetakgomo Municipality. 
However, we reckon that the results possess external validity for similar rural former 
homeland areas in Sekhukhune and neighbouring districts in the Limpopo Province, because 
of their similar economic, demographic, cultural and religious structures. 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our results provide quantitative empirical evidence that 
religiosity does influence economic success in the region studied. This effect, however, does 
not appear to be an influence of religious affiliation and church membership per se, but rather 
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to be contingent on specific patterns of social or intrinsic religiosity fostered in a religious 
community or, potentially, its dominant theological tenets. In particular, such patterns seem to 
exist in the ZCC. Our results are in line with the religious studies research arguing that many 
AICs promote economic upliftment (Cross et al., 1993; Schlemmer, 2008; Öhlmann et al., 
2016). Possibly, such patterns also exist in ATR. 
 
An impact of traditional religious practice on economic success has to the best of our 
knowledge thus far not been documented. How this specific religiosity might transmit to 
household income remains for future studies to discern. The ZCC, on the other hand, has been 
documented as a church fostering high degrees of religiosity among its members (in the 
Weberian sense as ecclesiastic-religious domination of life) and as promoting economically 
conducive attitudes (Mafuta 2010). Hence, the results resonate well with Weber’s hypothesis 
that increased religiosity leads to improved economic outcomes. Moreover, this church 
constitutes a network with millions of members and provides its members with various social 
capital-type resources, which directly relates to social capital theory. From our data, both 
seem plausible. ZCC members have the highest indicators of religiosity in the dataset both in 
the individual and in the social dimension.  
 
We see our analysis as a starting point in the quantitative analysis of the effects of religiosity 
on economic success in the rural areas of South Africa. Particularly three points merit further 
attention. First, comparative studies in other areas would provide insights as to whether the 
results are context-specific or possess cross-contextual validity. This might also yield an 
indication as to whether effects can be identified for other religious communities. Second, 
analyses based on larger samples (and potentially using panel data) would enable the use of 
more sophisticated econometric techniques required to further substantiate causal impacts of 
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religion on economic success. Third, in order to elucidate the actual transmission mechanisms 
of religiosity to economic success, in-depth analysis of these mechanisms is needed, 
particularly with respect to the religious communities highlighted above. 
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Table 1: Income sources in Fetakgomo 
Income source % of households 
receiving income 
from the source 
Mean monetary return  
per month in ZAR 
 
Agriculture   
Field crops 41 146  (206) 
Vegetables 29 98 (259) 
Livestock 53 391 (764) 
Fruit 56 24 (32) 
Gathering wood 69 137 (113) 
Agriculture total 94 429 (673) 
Other income sources   
Formal income (excluding social grants) 23 8 085  (7 835)   
Informal income 53 1 190 (1 395) 
Remittances 39 818 (680) 
Social grants  78 1 417 (868) 
Note: Standard deviation in brackets; amounts rounded to nearest ZAR 1; N=180. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. 
Income (ZAR) 305 32 735 4 356 4 933 
Household demographics     
gender [1=female] dummy .64  
age [years] 21 101 54.67 14.97 
size [number of household members] 1 15 4.80 2.44 
s_child [share of household members below age 18] 0 1 .45 .28 
s_pens [share of household members above age 65] 0 1 .14 .21 
Geography:     
road [distance to nearest tar road in km] 0 18 3.58 3.95 
shop[distance to closest supermarket in km] 0 75 18.53 18.13 
Human capital     
school [school years completed by household head] 0 12 5.76 4.84 
tertiary [tertiary education completed by household head, 
1=learnership, 2=college/university] 
0 2 .19 .53 
school_o [mean school years completed by adult 
household members, except household head] 
0 12 8.28 2.89 
learn [number of adult household members with 
completed learnership, except household head] 
0 2 .12 .34 
acad [number of adult household members with completed 
college/university, except household head] 
0 2 .09 .30 
clinic [1=clinic in village] dummy .69  
Social capital     
group [number of groups household head is a member of] 0 4 1.40 .74 
chief [household head’s relation to chief, 1=distant family 
or council member, 2=2nd degree relation or distant 
relation and council member, 3=1st degree relation or 
relation and senior councillor] 
0 3 .56 .81 
Note: N=180. 
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Table 3: Religious groups’ profiles 
 
Household income  
in ZAR 
School years 
completed 
Weekly 
church 
service 
attendance 
Weekly 
other 
church 
activities 
attendance 
Weekly 
prayer 
frequency 
All observations  4 356 (4 933) 5.76  (4.84) n/a 
Apostolic churches (12.8%) 
apostolic 
 3 006 (2 158) 5.78  (4.55) 1.52 (1.37) .57  (.51) 13.09  (5.30) 
Pentecostal-Charismatic 
churches (8.3%) charismatic 
 5 078  (8 034) 7.60  (5.58) 1.65 (1.34) 1.06  (.70) 12.83  (8.12) 
Mainline churches (5.0%) 
mainline 
      10 718  (10 556) 9.33  (3.87) 1.08   (.77) .47  (.71) 12.37  (4.64) 
Zion Christian Church (20.0%) 
zcc 
 4 216 (3 875) 6.08  (5.01) 1.78   (.87) 1.28  (.70) 14.44  (6.57) 
St. Engenas Zion Christian 
Church (12.8%) engenas 
 3 264  (1 988) 5.61  (4.75) 2.38 (1.20) 1.00  (.91) 12.75  (5.83) 
Other churches (2.8%) other  4 285  (1 053) 7.40  (4.98) 1.20   (.45) .80  (.84) 8.80  (5.17) 
All churches (61.7%)  4 415  (5 184) 6.45  (5.90) 1.75 (1.15) .96  (.77) 13.17  (6.21) 
African traditional religion 
(43.9%) atr 
 4 958  (5 974) 4.77  (4.79) n/a 
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets; household income rounded to nearest ZAR 1; N=180. 
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Table 4: Estimation results log-linear income equation 
 
I  II 
 
Coefficient 
Standard  
error 
 
Coefficient 
Standard  
error 
Constant 6.184 *** .440  6.460 *** .432 
Household demographics      
gender –.344  *** .106  –.286  *** .107 
age .016  ** .006  .012  ** .006 
size .096  *** .026  .101  *** .026 
s_child –.179  .236  –.185  .239 
s_pens .166  .327  .266  .332 
Geography      
road –.024  * .014  –.023  * .014 
shop .004  .003  .004  .003 
Human capital      
school .034  ** .015  .029  ** .015 
tertiary .648  *** .103  .683  *** .101 
school_o .008  .017  .003  .018 
learn .231  .155  .213  .158 
acad .363  ** .169  .385  ** .171 
clinic .028  .105  .061  .107 
Social capital      
group .064  .069  .034  .069 
chief –.086  .061  –.088  .061 
Religious groups      
mainline .286  .241    
zcc .469  *** .160    
engenas .166  .173    
apostolic -.156  .166    
charismatic .268  .204    
other .372 .313    
church    .181 .129 
atr .314  ** .124  .314  ** .124 
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(income); N=180; Adjusted R²= .48(I)/.45(II). *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
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Table 5: Probit estimates of membership in the ZCC and practice of ATR 
 
Membership in ZCC 
 
Practice of ATR 
 
Coefficient 
Standard error 
(asymptotic) 
 
Wald  
statistic 
 
Coefficient  
Standard error 
(asymptotic) 
Wald 
statistic 
constant –.828  1.154 .515  –1.079  1.081 .996 
gender .832  *** .350 5.658  –.404  .265 2.323 
school_o –.110  ** .050 4.910  –.010  .046 .051 
clinic .180  .298 .367  –.516  * .265 3.806 
chief .334  ** .163 4.181  .087  .149 0.344 
church     –2.027  *** .269 56.990 
atr –1.120  *** .307 13.310     
Notes: Dependent variables: prob(zcc=1), prob(atr=1); N=180; McFadden Pseudo R² = 0.24 (ZCC model), 0.377 
(ATR model). *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Non-significant coefficients omitted. 
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Table 6: Estimation results log-linear model with Heckman’s λ 
 
Estimation with ZCC Estimation with ATR 
 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
constant 6.505  *** .465 6.627  *** .478 
gender –.281  ** .112 –.318  ** .103 
age .012  * .007 .012  ** .006 
size .092  *** .026 .092  *** .022 
s_child –.084  .244   
s_pens .216  .347 .281  .322 
road –.027  * .015 –.025  * .014 
shop .004  .003 .004  .003 
school .031  ** .016 .029  ** .015 
tertiary .671  *** .100 .698  *** .103 
school_o   .004 .018 
learn .218  .153 .226  .155 
acad .391  ** .167 .414  ** .171 
clinic .054  .107   
groups .056  .069   
chief   –.079  .059 
church   .058  .286 
zcc .481  .501   
atr .185  .123 .056  .550 
λ1 –.092  .185 .045  .172 
λ0 1.531  1.957 .939  1.379 
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(income); N=180; Adjusted R²= .46. *p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01. Standard errors 
corrected according to Heckman (1979). 
 
 
